Abstract
Introduction
In a leveraged buyout, investors take a company private, with a view to recapitalize it, restructure it, and, eventually, take it public again. In most cases, those investors, usually termed "LBO specialists", are privatelyfunded and privately-owned organizations. Nevertheless, a few situations occurred in which States took the role of LBO specialists, issuing public debt to take a sizeable number of companies private, and to eventually take them public again. These uncommon situations occurred twice in Europe in recent years: in France between 1982 and 1999 , and in Portugal between 1975 In both cases, the State opted for nationalizations in a timing (late seventies, early eighties) where State ownership of companies was becoming a less popular choice among political leaders. After World War II, most mainstream economists (for instance, the Nobel Prize winners Allais [1947] , Meade [1948] and Lewis [1949] ) were generally in favour of State ownership [1] . As time went by, economists began to increasingly favour regulated private ownership (Niskanen [1971] , Buchanan [1972] , Vickers and Yarrow [1988] ). Influenced by these theories, politicians took to a privatizing stance that triggered a global privatization wave, usually referred to as beginning with the privatization of British Petroleum, in 1979. [2] Although this privatization wave spread over the planet rather quickly, specific political circumstances in Portugal and France caused an opposite move. The Portuguese Revolution of 1974, following a pro-communist military coup, led to a nationalization wave (in 1975 and 1976) and to the closing of the Lisbon Exchange between 1974 and 1977 (Alpalhão [2010] ). In 1981, the socialist victory in the French elections also led to generalized nationalizations (Langhör and Viallet [1986] ). In both cases, a large and spread over the entire economy State-owned sector emerged.
The combination of rather disappointing operating results and of an international environment where States were privatizing rather than nationalizing eventually led the French and Portuguese governments to reverse their buyouts in the market. French privatizations started in 1987 and Portuguese privatizations in 1989. The end result of this nationalization -privatization sequence was to make the French and Portuguese States take the de facto role of an LBO specialist in their domestic stock markets. This raises the question, addressed in this paper, of how do the States' experience compare with that of the privately-owned LBO specialist that took companies private and later did reverse LBO, taking the acquired companies public again. Do the States fare well as LBO specialists, or poorly?
The French experience has been documented in the literature in Dumontier and Laurin (2003) . In this paper, we draw conclusions from the dataset of the Portuguese nationalization and privatization sequence. The second section describes the methodology, the third the dataset, and the fourth computes value changes over the process and concludes.
Methodology
We aim at documenting the return on the Portuguese State's investment in shares of companies taken private in the nationalization wave of 1975-76, and then public again from 1989 on. This return translates into a wealth transfer from all Portuguese citizens to the purchasers of shares in the State's privatization offers. If the return is positive, the Portuguese citizens in general gain; if it is negative, this wealth transfer is detrimental to Portuguese citizens that did not acquire shares in the privatization offers.
To compute these returns, we compare the market values of nationalized companies at the time of their privatization with their theoretical value in a non-nationalization scenario. This approach is identical to Dumontier and Laurin (2003) [2003] in their analysis of China's privatized firms, we use market prices instead of accounting numbers, for two reasons: the conceptual superiority of market prices and the plain fact that the Portuguese data set (such as the French data set in Dumontier and Laurin [2003] ) offers market prices for the companies, both at the nationalization date and after privatization.
Data
Our sample includes all the Portuguese companies that were nationalized that meet the following criteria:
1. a listing in Lisbon at the time of their nationalization; and 2. a (second) initial public offer as the first (eventually only) privatization offer.
These criteria can be met by companies that undertook restructuring (mergers or similar operations) while under State-ownership and by companies that returned to the market in their original form. The State cherry-picked the companies to be relisted from the larger set of companies that had been nationalised in 1975 and 1976. These relatively large and well-known new listings played a decisive role in the uplift of the Lisbon Exchange to developed market status, granted by Morgan Stanley in 1997. The dependence of the value of indemnities paid in Portuguese nationalizations on payment means is addressed in a detailed fashion in Alpalhão (2010) . Portuguese indemnities following the 1974-5 nationalizations were set using as basis the weighted average of audited book value as at the last year before nationalisation (weight of 85 per cent) and the average [3] of high and low stock prices for each of the years between 1964 and 1974 (weight of 15 per cent). Indemnities were paid in cash only up to the amount of 50,000$00 PTE [4] (Portuguese Escudos, the Portuguese currency at the time), and all amounts above that value entitled stockholders to receive tradable governments bonds, called TNE, the acronym of Títulos de Nacionalização e Expropriação ("nationalisation and expropriation securities"). TNE paid interest, accrued since the nationalisation date and computed at rates varying inversely with the absolute indemnity value, with a maximum of 13.5 per cent and a minimum of 2.5 per cent (applicable to indemnities above PTE 6,050,000$00 [5] ). Market rates, at the time, were in the vicinity of 15% (Valério [2001] ).
Taking the nominal value of indemnities as metric, the mean indemnity was of almost precisely three billion PTE [6] , with a huge range between the maximum of almost thirteen billion (the electrical utility EDP) and a minimum of 195 million (the insurer Aliança). If, on the other hand, we take the weighted average indemnity using the weights of the thirteen different series of TNE issued (see Alpalhão [2010] for details), these figures are reduced by 54%, taking into account the fact that the present value of most TNE was severely below their respective nominal value, due to the very modest interest rates most of these securities carried.
These companies spent on average 214 months private, with a small range between a minimum of 174 months (the first privatization, the Totta & Açores bank) and a maximum of 270 months (EDP). This time frame is much bigger than in American SIPO, documented in Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989) 
Value changes
We compute the value change of the nationalized companies during their time as private companies as is the value of company j using the offer price and the denominator is the pre-privatization State investment in company j, adding the indemnities paid by the State and the net investment during the period between the nationalization and the privatization offer. N j ZP j is the value of the indemnities paid to the shareholders of company j, δ j is a factor that represents the net investment in the company during its years as a private (1) company, RBTA j represents the mean monthly return on the BTA index between the dates when indemnities were set for share j and its first privatization offer (which we define as the Republic's opportunity cost for its investment in nationalized shares), and E j is the number of months from the nationalization and the first privatization offer of company j.
The relevant net investment (GAFEEP [1995] , Vilar [1998] ) in the companies when private is given by the Republic's cash outflow to the nationalized companies derived from its shareholders status (that is, without taking into account subsidies and compensations paid to nationalized companies that rendered public services, as well as debt for shares swaps and debt guarantees) and dividends paid to the Republic by the nationalized companies.
In percentage of indemnities,
where δ 1 j and δ 2 j represent, respectively, the Republic's cash out-flow due to its shareholder status and the dividends paid to the Republic.
Since this information is not available for each company every year, we take δ j = δ, j  , and compute δ using the data documented in Vilar (1998) for the period 1978-1997 (table 4) .
_ TAKE IN TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE -
On average, the Republic's net investment, after nationalizations, was 89.3% higher than the amount spent in indemnities, making δ=1.893.
ΔV j represents the annual return on the shares of the j-th company to be nationalized and privatized (in a E j months holding period). A suitable benchmark for this return is the market portfolio's return, as usually used to assess the returns of private equity investments (Kaplan and Schoar's [2005] public market equivalent). The fact that we are analyzing returns in private companies makes the calculation of excess returns, that is, the difference between the annual return on the shares of the j-th company and its expected return, using for example the capital asset pricing model, infeasible. We therefore define the market return in the same holding period as ΔVBTA j as [7] . We use this return to discount the values of the net investment in each company, that, for lack of more precise data, we assume occurred in the mid point of the private company period. 
_ TAKE IN FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE -
On the eve of the setting of the indemnities to be paid to banks and insurers' shareholders, the index value was 60.9, 32.5% below its opening value (90.2 as at April 1, 1977) . On the day of the EDP offer, the BTA stood at 4330.2, 36.4% below its all-time high of October 6, 1987, immediately before the interview of Prime Minister Aníbal Cavaco Silva to the Portuguese National Television where he commented that "cats were being sold for the price of hares" [8] on the Lisbon Exchange.
We define the abnormal return on the j-th company as During a period of high volatility, the Portuguese Republic's performance as equity investor and manager was lacklustre, both in absolute terms and relatively to the public market equivalent. No offer posts a positive value change. The mean (and the median) of the offers presents a negative change of -6.81% (-6.63%), both statistically significant at the 1% level. That is, the State did not even recover capital invested in indemnities and subsequent investments in nationalized companies. Additionally, but confirming the fragile investments done by the Portuguese State, the portfolio mean
(abnormal return is clearly negative (-29.84% unweighted and -28.25% weighted) and different from zero at the 1% significance level.
A negative value for this return is consistent with the generalized empirical evidence of post-privatization performance improvement, although the source of negative returns may not be totally due to inefficient management, taking into account privatization pricing tactics and market conditions at the time of the privatization offers.
In the French case, Dumontier and Laurin (2003) document a return only slightly below zero (-0.25%), pointing to a negligible value destruction.
Muscarella and Vetsuypens' (1990) work on American SIPO documents an absolute return of 268.4%, much above the Portuguese numbers, but not significantly different from zero after adjustment for leverage and market returns.
Conclusion
We can conclude that the Portuguese citizens, as indirect investors in the nationalized companies, earned a return much lower than the one available to them through a passive investment in the Portuguese market portfolio, and also lower than the returns earned in comparable international cases. The Portuguese Republic did a poor job as an LBO specialist. This table reports the time series of the Portuguese nationalizations of public companies that were later privatized in public offers. In share issue privatizations made through several offers in different moments in time, the reported year is the one of the first offer. characteristics of 15 public share offers of (previously public) nationalized companies or of companies resulting from mergers of (previously public) nationalized companies. Indemnities (1), (2) and (3) quantify, respectively, the indemnities paid at the nominal value of indemnities, with TNE class XII and with the weighted average, with chapter 2 weights. Post-offer equity value is the market capitalization of outstanding shares at the close price of the first trading day. All values are in thousands of Portuguese Escudos. This table compares means (and medians) of indemnities of nationalized firms with the results of firms´s privatization (offer size and post-offer equity value). µI1, µI2, µI3, µO, and µPO are respectively means (medians) of indemnities, offer size and post-offer equity value. 
